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COMMENTARY ON PROFESSOR RICHARD SANDER'S CLASS
IN AMERICAN LEGAL ED UCA TION
L. DARNELL WEEDENt
INTRODUCTION
Professor Sander's article discussing class in American Legal edu-
cation is an open invitation for thoughtful individuals to discuss real stu-
dent diversity-involving much more than simply support of racial di-
versity. Racial diversity in a law school is indeed a desirable goal. In an
American society with an increasing class divide, the continual quest for
racial diversity is misguided if pursued without an equally aggressive
attempt to have the law school classroom reflect the social and economic
diversity that exists in America. Even in rhetorical terms, the historical
debate about diversity in the legal academy has been understood as ex-
clusively promoting racial diversity at the expense of any real articula-
tion of the need for class-based diversity.
As a practical matter, the diversity that the legal academy should
address in the future should include a deliberate and focused discussion
regarding class or socioeconomic status (SES) issues because the pri-
mary continuing effect of historical racial discrimination is economic
disadvantage. In white urban neighborhoods, only one percent of the
community is "extremely impoverished."' The poverty rate of the Latino
neighborhoods is similar to that of African American neighborhoods;
twenty-two percent are in low poverty.2 Twenty-five percent of the Afri-
can American communities suffer "extreme levels of poverty." Signifi-
cantly, these impoverished communities are also marginalized in that
they suffer from inadequate education, unemployment, and high incar-
ceration rates.4
Although racial discrimination against blacks is the predominant
factor leading to economic disadvantage in the black community, I do
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1. Ruth D. Peterson & Lauren J. Krivo, Race, Residence, and Violent Crime: A Structure of
Inequality, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 903, 924 (2009).
2. Id.
3. See id.
4. Geneva Brown, The Wind Cries Mary-The Intersectionality of Race, Gender, and Reen-
try: Challenges for African-American Women, 24 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT 625, 643 (2010).
5. See id. (discussing the disproportionate impact the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act, which denies drug offenders eligibility for public assistance for life,
has on African Americans, particularly African American women and children).
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not think racial disadvantage and class disadvantage are the same. I agree
with the position that a significant degree of both race and class based
discrimination systematically exist in America and in its law schools.6
Professor Kleven argues that the United States is an inherently classist
and racist society-and that classism and racism are interconnected with
common characteristics. 7 It is clearly a very plausible argument that ra-
cism and classism are interconnected. If one accepts Kleven's assertion
to be true-that racism and classism are interconnected-then it is unac-
ceptable for institutions (with the responsibility to collect statistics and
facts beneficial to the legal academy) to collect a wide-range of informa-
tion associated with race without collecting a quantity of systematic in-
formation concerning SES that might impact a person's opportunity to
become a law student, a lawyer, or a law professor.8 Thus, because clas-
sism and racism are interconnected, Sander's article, at a minimum, is a
necessary and proper call to the Law School Admissions Council, the
National Association for Law Placement, the American Association of
Law Schools, and the American Bar Foundation to collect relevant sys-
tematic data regarding the impact of class or socioeconomic status on the
legal profession.9
Reasonable minds can disagree as to the nature and quantity of ei-
ther race-based discrimination or class-based disadvantage. Nevertheless,
if I had the ability to prohibit the practice of racial discrimination in
America, and end it today, without addressing SES issues, most African
Americans would remain at a competitive disadvantage in American
society because of SES issues.10 Regardless of race, if racial discrimina-
tion ceased to exist, African Americans would only become competitive
in society by inclusion in broad-based social and economic justice poli-
cies designed to help all similarly situated individuals." Obviously, in
our social order blacks have experienced racial discrimination incalcula-
bly more than any other racial group. 12 By focusing on class rather than
race-in creating diversity in law school classrooms-the legal academy
undermines the argument that race-based affirmative action plans in law
school admission plans produce reverse racial discrimination against
whites.13 A class-based admission process to promote diversity is a rea-
6. Thomas Kleven, Systemic Classism, Systemic Racism: Are Social and Racial Justice
Achievable in The United States?, 8 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 207, 207 (2009).
7. Id.
8. See Richard H. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, 88 DENv. U. L. REV. 631,
632 n.3 (2011).
9. Id
10. See Peterson & Krivo, supra note 1, at 924.
11. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989).
12. Id. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring).
13. Id. at 528 ("Racial preferences appear to 'even the score' (in some small degree) only if
one embraces the proposition that our society is appropriately viewed as divided into races, making
it right that an injustice rendered in the past to a black man should be compensated for by discrimi-
nating against a white. Nothing is worth that embrace. Since blacks have been disproportionately
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sonable means of avoiding the problems associated with an admission
system utilizing racial preference since it would directly contribute to the
objective of increasing opportunities for economically underprivileged
applicants without discriminating on the basis of race. 14 In Regents of
University of California v. Baake,15 Justice Powell argued that an admis-
sions program could be hindered if it concentrated only on ethnic diver-
sity; thus, it should include a class based-system to enhance diversity.1
Under a class-based admission program, minorities would still receive
admission preferences because a relatively high number of minority
groups are impoverished.17
I suppose one could argue that the search-which has occurred over
the past several decades-for race-based student diversity at elite law
schools speaks collectively about both race and class only in a very re-
stricted set of circumstances. Traditionally, race and class have only been
addressed as a consequence of the theory that traditional race-based af-
firmative action law school admission policies open doors of opportunity
predominantly to those African Americans from upper or middle class
families.18 Almost all of the nonwhite law students, similar to their white
cohorts, are from rather elite families.19
The great debate about diversity in legal education over the last sev-
eral decades has been about promoting racial diversity as a symbolic
gesture of social justice without any similar promotion of class-based
diversity as an effective tool for advancing social justice. A race-neutral
class-based SES admission policy is a necessary and proper tool to effec-
tively generate graduating classes at elite law schools that reflect the
interesting intermix of SES and racial diversity in American society.
Sander's article makes a very valuable contribution to diversity scholar-
ship by inviting scholars to systematically explore the issue of whether
the law school community should begin to address SES law school ad-
mission policies with the same energy it has utilized to justify race-based
admission criteria.20
Sander's article does an excellent job of demonstrating how the lack
of SES diversity in American law schools requires those promoting true
intellectual diversity at law schools to seek both racial and economic
diversity with equal vigor. Sander provides information that reveals that
a very large percentage of American law students are from rather privi-
disadvantaged by racial discrimination, any race-neutral remedial program aimed at the disadvan-
taged as such will have a disproportionately beneficial impact on blacks.").
14. John P. Cronan, The Diversity Justification in Higher Education: Evaluating Disadvan-
taged Status in School Admissions, 34 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 305, 321 (2001).
15. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
16. Id. at 311-15.
17. Cronan, supra note 14, at 320.
18. See Sander, supra note 8, at 632.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 632-33.
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leged families.21 For example, at elite law schools, only ten percent of the
students are from families at the bottom half of the SES stratum. 22 If
blacks and Hispanics are effectively represented in law schools (when
judged against the total number of college graduates) while low and
moderate SES college graduates are not adequately represented, it is im-
perative that a strategic plan be implemented in the law school commu-
nity addressing the development and improvement of SES diversity.23
I. DATA AND THE MEASUREMENT OF CLASS
Sander has provided a good example of how legal scholars can in-
corporate demographics statistics from social science to measure the
class or SES divide among people living in America, while exploring the
merits of class-based diversity in legal education.24 From a historical
perspective, it is clearly appropriate to implement social science data to
support class-based diversity in legal education on account of the impor-
tant role social science data has played in promoting equality in educa-
tion. Take, for example, Brown v. Board of Education,2 5 where social
science data was a pivotal factor in demonstrating stark racial inequali-
ties, which helped facilitate a decision promoting equality in our system
of education. 26
Theoretically, Sander's position that the impact of class or socio-
economic status in contemporary Western society is multifaceted and
complex 2 7 should be viewed with suspicion and perhaps even rejected
because no matter who the poor people in society are (i.e., black, His-
panic, white), they are typically ignored by their neighbors and marginal-
ized by society.28 Unlike the disadvantaged poor, however, the rich have
influence over, and contact with, many powerful friends.29 In general, as
a result of this power and influence, the privileged receive the best avail-
able education and are overrepresented in the most promising and pres-
tigious professions. Sander's use of SES statistics and racial demograph-
ics demonstrates what the human experience already knows; that those
with the most money and their offspring are more likely to earn a higher
income from investments, acquire both a better education and a higher
level of education, and hold the more desirable occupations.
I believe that Sander's use of a numerical SES Index is a useful al-
ternative heuristic tool to support a discussion regarding class-based di-
versity in legal education, but I reject any suggestion that the numerical
21. See id.
22. Id. at 643.
23. See id. at 633.
24. See generally Sander, supra note 8.
25. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
26. Id. at 495 n.11.
27. See Sander, supra note 8, at 633.




SES Index is necessary to move this alternative diversity discussion from
"beyond vague generalities." 30 Instead of using the numerical SES Index
to support the SES diversity option in legal education, I think the dispa-
rate impact analysis adopted in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 3 1 forty years
ago-with its potential for a significantly more limited use of numbers-
is equally as effective and perhaps less burdensome to demonstrate that a
class-based or SES diversity admission policy is beneficial for legal edu-
cation and represents good public policy.
II. SES PROFILES FROM THE AJD
According to Sander, the After the JD study (AJD) is the top avail-
able resource available regarding the SES of modern-day law students.3 2
AJD produced a nationally representative illustration of some four thou-
sand law graduates who were licensed as attorneys in 1999 or 2000." As
a result of the self-evident universal truth that privileged elites have
many friends while the economically disadvantaged are virtually without
any powerful friends, 34 the findings of the AJD should not be surprising.
The AJD SES disparity study reveals that approximately fifty percent of
the students at elite law schools have parents in the upper tenth of the
SES divide in America, whereas merely one-tenth of the students have
parents from the bottom fifty percent of the SES divide.35 Or, to state it
another way, a young person living in the United States and fortunate
enough to have parents whose SES positioned them in the top ten percent
of the SES divide were twenty-four times more probable to attend an
elite law school when compared to a young person whose parents' SES
situated them in the bottom fifty percent of the national SES divide.36
The fact that the economic divide makes one student twenty-four times
more likely to go to an elite school than another demonstrates that no one
who is serious about diversity in the legal education can afford to ignore
the compelling justification for an SES preference admission policy.
III. SOME HISTORICAL CONTEXT
From an historical perspective of legal education, the incredible ad-
vantage given to elite members of society to receive a legal education at
an elite law school has not changed in the last forty years. 37 The available
data confirms that there has not been any increase in SES diversity for
the last four decades.38 The available data and historical trends make a
30. Sander, supra note 8, at 634.
31. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
32. Sander, supra note 8, at 634 (citing RONIT DINOVITZER ET AL., AFTER THE JD: FIRST
RESULTS OF A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS (Janet E. Smith et al. eds., 2004)).
33. Sander, supra note 8, at 634.
34. Proverbs 14:20 (New International Version).
35. Sander, supra note 8, at 637.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 644.
38. Id. at 645 tbl.4.
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compelling justification to adopt SES diversity-based admission pro-
grams in elite schools and throughout legal education.
IV. COMPARING RACIAL AND SES DIVERSITY
Sander's heuristic numerical Tables 5, 6, and 7 lend very credible
support to his conclusion that efforts directed at increasing racial diver-
sity-attempting to remedy the effects of racial discrimination-have
been very successful when compared to the wayward efforts to assist
disadvantaged socioeconomic groups (regardless of race). If it is true
that college graduates of every race go to law school in almost equal
proportions, then the information in Table 6 demonstrates the relatively
unremarkable conclusion that-in the context of acquiring a legal educa-
tion in America today-class or SES matters more than race in determin-
ing a person's chances of attending law school.40 Additionally, the data
in Table 7 inspired Sander to make the following conclusion:41 "Indeed,
it is fair to say that low-SES representation at elite law schools is compa-
rable to racial representation fifty years ago, before the civil rights revo-
lution."42 I support Sander's heuristic rationale (articulated nearly fifteen
years ago) for expanding the opportunities to attain a legal education
based on SES, rather than focusing exclusively on race: (1) increased
SES diversity in law schools will create a better education for all stu-
dents, by giving each student an expanded opportunity to simulate "real"
world experiences; (2) enrolling a greater percentage of low-end SES
students at a law school, who subsequently become lawyers, creates di-
versity in the legal profession while simultaneously increasing the le-
gitimacy of the legal profession in the eyes of an increasingly diverse
public; (3) low-end SES candidates in fact enhance the value of the stu-
dent body experience in law school because standardized test scores and
traditional admissions criteria devalue the potential and competence of
low-end SES candidates; (4) assisting low-end SES candidates to enter
law school and successfully become lawyers expands social mobility by
decreasing poverty and boosting economic equality by closing the SES
gap; (5) socioeconomic preferences are a "race-blind" replacement for
traditional affirmative action that will expand diversity in legal educa-
tion.43
The truth of the matter is that there is virtually no overlap between
SES and racial diversity because non-white students attending law school
are usually from somewhat elite status (in particular, at the best law
schools).44 Because of the somewhat elite status of racial minorities in
39. Id. at 646-49.
40. Id. at 648 tbl.6.
41. Id. at 649 tbl.7.
42. Id. at 649.
43. Richard H. Sander, Experimenting with Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 472,475-76 (1997).
44. Sander, supra note 8, at 655-56.
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law school, racial diversity as a general rule does not advance socioeco-
nomic diversity in legal education.
VI. LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS PRACTICES
The Grutter v. Bollinger4 6 decision endorsed a separate and elitist-
focused admission system in legal education. In this case, the Court up-
held an admission practice where students with the highest LSAT scores
and undergraduate grades-within each racially elite cohort-had the
greatest opportunity to be admitted to law school.47 Sander's data reveals
that the Grutter decisions give law schools permission to practice a race-
based, but elitist, system of admitting students.4 ' A law school admission
system that favors the elite of all races at the expense of those in society
who are economically disadvantaged is truly tainted.4 9
VII. THE ATTAINABILITY OF "CLASS DIVERSITY"
Sander identifies the UCLA School of Law class-based diversity
initiative as an example of a successful race-neutral law school admis-
sion program because it expanded both SES diversity and racial diversity
in the law school student population.o Nonetheless, Sander's conclu-
sion-that the UCLA Law School's class-based preference system was
only successful because most other law schools were not implementing a
SES based preference in their admission process-should be rejected
because of a lack of data to support this conclusion. I am confident that a
similar study in the future will reveal that virtually every law school act-
ing in good faith can advance SES diversity in legal education by delet-
ing any consideration of race.
Indeed, "[i]t is well established that when the government distrib-
utes burdens or benefits on the basis of individual racial classifications,
that action is reviewed under strict scrutiny."5 Under the strict scrutiny
standard, each law school with a racial preference admission plan should
at least be required to provide compelling evidence that a UCLA type
SES plan would not advance intellectual diversity in legal education.5 2
Unlike Sander, I think the UCLA SES plan can be implemented success-
fully at other law schools even if every law school in the country has
implemented an SES admission preference plan to close the class divide.
Diversity in American education is a positive thing for law students and
the law school community. Because "[SES] discrimination is the pre-
45. Id.
46. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
47. Id. at 315-16, 343-44.
48. Sander, supra note 8, at 667-68.
49. See generally L. Darnell Weeden, After Grutter v. Bollinger Higher Education Must Keep
Its Eyes on the Tainted Diversity Prize Legacy, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 161 (2004).
50. Sander, supra note 8, at 661-62.
51. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007).
52. See Weeden, supra note 49, at 198-99.
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dominant impediment to achieving meaningful educational diversity" in
the legal academy, it is proper to regard the UCLA SES preference plan
as providing effective race-neutral tools to close America's SES legal
education divide. 3 The legal academy "must work harder by thinking
outside the race box to expand diversity" to those students with a disad-
vantaged SES history while deleting race as a factor in its admission cri-
teria.54
My commitment to the concept of economic justice in our society
leads me to believe that the successful SES diversity plan at UCLA fur-
ther supports my conclusion articulated in an earlier commentary ad-
dressing race-neutral affirmative action programs. I posited, and continue
to support the assertion, that "the Michigan Law School [in Grutter] did
not make a compelling case that there were no effective race-neutral al-
ternatives to achieve diversity."5
Similarly, I argued, "Race-based affirmative action programs should
be rejected in law schools as a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause."56 Likewise, "a law school can meet its goals of a qualified and
diverse student body by considering class, lack of cultural exposure, in-
teresting life experiences, present and historical economic status, and
57skills;" no discussion of race is necessary.
VIII. COMPARING THE ADVANTAGES OF "CLASS" VERSUS "RACIAL"
PREFERENCES
As I said fifteen years ago:
Because racial determinations [supporting diversity] are likely to be
subjected to either misuse or misunderstanding by both the propo-
nents and opponents of race-based affirmative action, race-based af-
firmative action programs intended to bring diversity to a law school
should be abandoned in favor of [SES] as a basis for affirmative ac-
58tion.
Unlike race, an SES-preference admission program "would be subject to
the rational basis level of judicial review rather than the much tougher
strict scrutiny standard of judicial review."5 9 Under the rational basis
theory, a state sponsored SES diversity program is entitled to a presump-
tion of constitutional validity under the rationale of United States v.
53. See, e.g., L. Darnell Weeden, Employing Race-Neutral Affirmative Action to Create
Educational Diversity While Attacking Socio-economic Status Discrimination, 19 ST. JOHN'S J.
LEGAL COMMENT 297, 297 (2005).
54. Id. at 332.
55. Id.
56. L. Darnell Weeden, Yo, Hopwood, Saying No to Race-Based Affirmative Action is the
Right Thing to do from an Afrocentric Perspective, 27 CUMB. L. REv. 533, 536 (1996-1997).
57. Id.




Carolene Products Co. 60 Even if there are currently no federal cases in
the pipeline challenging the admissions practices at law schools for vio-
lation of the Grutter guidelines, 61 undergraduate race-conscious admis-
sion guidelines implemented at the University of Texas under the Grutter
rationale were unsuccessfully challenged as a violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin.62 While evaluat-
ing the elements of the University of Texas' race-conscious admissions
policy, it is clear that the structure was modeled after the Grutter pro-
gram, which the Supreme Court decided did not qualify as a quota.
According to the Fifth Circuit, "Grutter is best read as a path toward the
moment when all race-conscious measures become unnecessary."" In
order to make race-conscious measures unnecessary, Grutter requires
law schools that utilize race-conscious admissions to honestly consider
the race-neutral SES option utilized by the UCLA law school.s While it
is conceded that "[n]arrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every
conceivable race-neutral alternative," 66 it must at a minimum require
compelling evidence that the UCLA SES preference plan will not en-
hance intellectual diversity at the law school.
CONCLUSION
Professor Sander's thoughtful heuristic presentation of the role of
class in American legal education suggests that SES in the age of Obama
has arguably replaced race as the new battle cry in the Twenty-first Cen-
tury for social justice. Thus, at a minimum, SES matters in one's ability
to attend law school. The issue facing the legal community now is
whether SES matters more than race in deciding who goes to law school.
Nevertheless, my reading of Sander's article leads me to the conclusion
that reasonable minds in legal education could disagree as to whether
SES matters more than race in deciding who attends law school in Amer-
ica.
60. Id. (citing 304 U.S. 144 (1938)).
61. Sander, supra note 8, at 668.
62. 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011).
63. Id. at 235.
64. Id. at 238.
65. Id
66. Id (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339-40 (2003)).
8592011]1

